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INTRODUCING THE TAX PATTERN *
The tax law has been getting out of hand. Text writers and the
tax services have been struggling valiantly to condense, interpret and
correlate the mass of material which nowadays comprises that law.
There have been, in moderate number, sound analyses, brilliant criti-
cisms and competent summaries. But to the general practitioner the
tax law has become the mysterious domain of the tax specialist. Yet,
the general practitioner has become increasingly aware of the impact
of taxation upon the subject matter of his practice. He knows that he
may not draw a trust or a will, nor prepare or foreclose a mortgage,
nor organize or liquidate a corporation, without potential tax conse-
quences. These consequences he must ferret out from an Internal
Revenue Code which is primarily an instruction book for the prepara-
tion of a tax return-an accountant's handbook. The Code presents
a numerical sequence of "items" of income, deductions, credits, ex-
clusions and exemptions, with no pretence of a subject-matter correla-
tion. The synthesis of these items into a complete tax picture for his
own transaction is a formidable task for any lawyer. Because the
texts and services have uniformly followed the statutory pattern, the
lawyer's principal guide to his problem is a labyrinth of confusing
indices.
The tax pattern technique is the product of considerable experi-
menting with the "subject-matter" approach. It has been developed
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* This article will form the substance of a chapter of a treatise on federal income,
estate and gift taxation, to be published this year by Matthew 'Bender and Company,
Albany, New York.
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with three major aims: (i) a reallocation of the tax law to coincide
with the lawyer's understanding of subject-matter division; (2) a vis-
ual summary and coordination of the various tax aspects of each major
subject-matter; and (3) annotations keyed to the summaries for com-
plete discussion of each point involved.
The present article is a representative example of the method.
The traditional approach to the problem-the chapter on royalty in-
come, the chapter on depletion deductions, the chapter on capital gains
and losses-has been scrapped. It is too clear to require demonstra-
tion that no one of the tax aspects of an oil and gas lease relationship
may be understood without an understanding of its correlative aspects.
The specific tax rules, therefore, have been subordinated to the rela-
tionships themselves: lessor-lessee, assignor-assignee, producer-drilling
contractor, producer-investor, etc. The tax rules thus summarized
within each box of the chart: assume a coherence which is but faintly
perceptible in the statute itself.
I. THFE LEASEHOLD RELATIONsHaIPs
There are several factors which contribute to the complexity of
the tax law relating to oil and gas income. One is the varying nature
of the tax issues themselves. Another is the unique concept pervading
the cases of "interests in the oil and gas in place", and the consequences
of the gradual exhaustion of such interests. The most complicating
factor, however, is the number and the variety of the interests which
participate in the production. of the income.
Let us take a simple case. Mr. Farmer owns a modest ranch
for which, many years ago, he paid $ioooo. Oil is discovered a few
miles away, and Mr. Farmer is visited by Mr. Speculator. The result-
ing deal is a lease of the oil, gas, and mineral rights of the ranch to
Mr. Speculator, for which Mr. Farmer receives a $50,000 cash "bonus",
plus a "royalty" equal to Y of the gross selling price of the oil to be
produced during the term of the lease.
The oil fields a few miles away develop better than expected, and
Mr. Speculator is ready to turn over a profit. He visits Mr. Promoter,
and another deal is made. He assigns his leasehold interest (subject,
of course, to Mr. Farmer's Y royalty) and receives from Mr. Pro-
moter $8oooo in cash, and an "oil payment" of 1/16 of the gross oil
to be produced until he sha[l have received an additional $200,ooo.
Mr. Speculator has thus come out of the transaction with $30,ooo net
;cash, plus a 1/16 oil payment right to the extent of $2oo,ooo. Mr.
Promoter, at a cost of $8o,ooo has acquired a Y8 "working interest",
subject to a 1/16 oil payment.
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Mr. Promoter now calls upon The Big Gusher Development Co.,
and another assignment of the Farmer lease is effected. Mr. Promoter
recoups his $8oooo cash investment, and acquires a 8 royalty interest
plus a $ioo,ooo oil payment to be paid out of i/i6 of the oil pro-
duced. The development company, at a cost of $8oooo, is now the
owner of a 4 working interest, subject to two separate 1/16 oil pay-
ments.
At long last the property is in the hands of a company interested
in actual production. But The Big Gusher Development Co. is not
equipped for drilling a well, so there is a conference with The Deep
Drilling Co. The latter estimates that it will cost $2oooo to drill a
well on the property, and would like to charge $30,ooo for the job.
Big Gusher counters with the proposition of $ioooo in cash, and a
speculative $5o,ooo to be paid out of i/i6 of the oil to be produced.
Another paper is signed, and the oil presses anticipatorily against its
enclosing rock.
There may still, however, be the problem of development capital.
Big Gusher obtains $50,000 from The Oil Finance Co. in return for
a i/i6 "participating interest" in gross production for the life of the
lease. By this time the interest remaining to the development company
is an ii/i6 working interest, subject to 3/16 oil payments aggregat-
ing $350,000.
Up to this point, remember, not one drop of oil has been produced.
Yet, there have been many taxable transactions; and, anomalously,
considerable "income from the property" has been realized, and "de-
pletion" deductions have been incurred. Suppose now that the various
investors turn out to be the victims of wildcat optimism. A complete
set of tax problems results. Or, more happily, the property produces.
For every barrel of oil, there may be a tankload of tax complications.
Our sextet above is not a fantastic example. It could easily be worse.
Mr. Speculator may want to realize on his $200,000 i/i6 oil payment
in advance of production, by selling a one-half interest for $5o,ooo
in cash. Mr. Promoter, somewhat skeptical of the Farmer property,
trades his 3/8 royalty interest for an oil payment right in an adjoining
property. Deep Drilling Co., having finished its job, liquidates; the
stockholders receive their pro rata share of its $50,000 i/16 oil pay-
ment as a liquidating dividend. Mr. Farmer dies, and his heirs inherit
his 1 royalty interest. Big Gusher Development Co., to utilize the
anticipated gas production, -contracts with a casinghead gasoline plant
for the removal and processing of the gas in return for a percentage
of the gross income from gasoline and dry gas. The tax cases contain
all of these-and others.
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And thus the cases come before the Treasury, the Board of Tax
Appeals, and the courts. What part of Mr. Farmer's $50oo is sub-
ject to tax? Is Mr. Speculator's profit ordinary income or is it cap-
ital gain? Mr. Promoter spent and received $8o,ooo in cash; does
he pay tax because he received also a speculative interest in an unopened
well? Does The Big Gusher Development Co. obtain taxable income
when The Deep Drilling Co. opens the well? Or when Oil Finance Co.
pays it $5o,ooo for development? Does The Deep Drilling Co. have
a $io,ooo expense, or does it have a capital investment in the prop-
erty? And after production begins, the problems multiply. The Big
Gusher Development Co. receives all of the production income, and
passes it to the various 38's and I/I6's along the line; must it pay
tax on any part of the money it does not keep? The Deep Drilling
Co. gets back the balance of its $2o,ooo drilling cost; does it have
taxable income, or may it offset its expense? May Oil Finance Co.
recoup its $50,000 out of the first production, or must it await depletion
deductions? And then interests are sold and exchanged and devised;
and the interests must be evaluated and apportioned. The stratums of
tax problems exceed those of the rock in the geologist's notebook.
There are few fields in the tax law where the allocation of the tax
burden appears so difficult. Income from both speculation and pro-
duction must be determined in relation to the varying kinds and
amounts of investment, and to the values of the interests retained in
the property. Most complicating of all, the income must be measured
with a gauge recording the exhaustion of the property. For, on some
not entirely predictable date, the property which produced the gusher
will inevitably be just a piece of land with a big hole. Theoretically,
the tax law is designed to have that date coincide with the last of a
series of reasonable depletion deductions. Since that deduction is an
integral part of every oil and gas tax problem, a brief summary of
the "mechanics" of depletion would seem appropriate, before it is con-
sidered in connection with the various relationships comprising an oil
and gas lease.
II. THE DEPLETION DEDUCTION
The depletion allowance is intended primarily to compensate the
taxpayer for the exhaustion of the contents of his well. Fundamen-
tally,' the taxpayer is entitled to a reasonable annual allowance based
i. "Fundamentally" the taxpayer is entitled to no such deduction, since all deduc-
tions are a matter of legislative grace. Depletion is no exception. Burnet v. Thomp-
son Oil & Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301 (1931) ; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103
(1916) ; see Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 525 (1917). Perhaps
this is too glib a statement. There is some justification for the contention that deduc-
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upon cost, or other statutory basis. The equivalent of this allowance
in the case of deteriorating assets, as distinguished from depleting
assets, is the depreciation deduction.2  This compensating deduction
for the decline in the content of oil and gas wells resulting from pro-
duction and sale is known as "cost depletion". But Congress, con-
cerned first with encouraging the pioneer and wildcatter in the oil and
gas industry (and in certain phases of the mining industry), and dis-
turbed later by the "everlasting accounting" problem in computing the
depletion allowance, evolved as an alternative to cost depletion the
"percentage depletion" method, and permitted the oil and gas taxpayer
to use this latter method if it produced a greater deduction in any
year.3 Thus "tax gravy" was discovered as a new by-product of oil
and gas.4 To date no Congressional attack has gathered sufficient
strength to shake this subsidy out of the statute. Incidental to the
depletion allowance is the problem of recovering the cost, or other
basis, of improvements and equipment not attributable to the well it-
self.5
The three factors applied in determining cost depletion are "basis",
"units sold" and "remaining units". The basis used is the same as
the basis for computing gain, which in turn is cost, or other statutory
basis, adjusted for depletion.6 There is excluded from the amount
tions designed to accomplish the tax-free return of a taxpayer's capital are inherently
necessary as a matter of computation to arrive at income. Davis v. United States, 87
F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 3oi U. S. 704 (1937). So far as deple-
tion is concerned the "gross income concept" is academic, for the statute since 1913 has
authorized a deduction for this factor.
2. "In essence, the deduction for depletion does not differ from the deduction for
depreciation." United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 303 (1927). One is quantitative,
the other qualitative.
3. See SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORy OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAX LAWS (1938)
352, 583-586. The percentage depletion alternative was first incorporated in § 2o4 (c)
(2) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as a substitute for the "discovery depletion" method,
which was then presenting difficult problems of application and valuation. Discovery
depletion is now applicable only in the case of mines, other than metal, coal or sulphur,
where the discovery was made by the taxpayer after February 28, 1913, and the result-
ing fair market value became disproportionate to cost. INT. REv. CODE § 114 (b) (2);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-3.
4. Percentage depletion was to be the rule of thumb designed to replace the com-
plicated accounting involved in cost depletion. As a practical matter taxpayers com-
pute both cost and percentage depletion to be sure of securing the greater deduction.
But the odds seem to be in favor of percentage depletion. "The estimated annual loss
of revenue due to this source alone is about $75,000,00o". Tax Evasion Message of
President Roosevelt, June I, 1937. Moreover, cost depletion computations are a pre-
requisite to a determination of adjusted basis for gain or loss. See note 6 infra.
5. This deduction is in addition to and apart from the depletion deduction. See
note 28 ilnfra.
6. INT. R y. CODE § 114 (b) (I) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. io3, § i9.23 (m)-2. For basis
other than cost, see INT. RErv. CODE § 113 (a). Cost, or other statutory basis, of the
depletable property must be adjusted for cost depletion to the extent allowed, but not
less than the amount allowable. In addition, where percentage depletion was deducted
in the taxable year 1932 or subsequent years, the basis must be further adjusted for
any excess over cost depletion. IxT. Ray. CoDE § 113 (b) (i) (B). The Bureau has
ruled that depletion deductions beginning with 1932 in excess of the cost basis of any
-well, are applicable to the reduction of the basis of other wells on the property, even
if drilled in a subsequent year. G. C. M. 22239, i94o-2 Cum. BULL. I05. The cost of
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of the basis the cost or value of the land not used for oil or gas pro-
duction, the amount recoverable through depreciation and through de-
ductions other than depletion, and the residual value of other property
at the end of operations, 7 but there is included those amounts of capi-
talized "intangible drilling and development expenses" which are recov-
erable through depletion." If the basis used is "cost", it must be shown
to have been incurred in a bona fide purchase and sale.9 If basis is
dependent upon fair market value, such value must be determined in
the light of an assumed transfer, as of the date of valuation, between
a willing seller and a willing buyer.10 In the absence of fair market
value factors, value may 'be determined by "analytical appraisal"
methods.'-
The Treasury Regulations recognize a borderline class of expend-
itures, commonly known as "intangible drilling and development ex-
penses". 12 Generally, these are the items incurred in drilling wells
and preparing them for production which do not in themselves have
any salvage value, such as the expenditures for wages, fuel, repair,
drilling nonproductive wells may at the taxpayer's option be deducted for the year in
which the well is completed, or may be capitalized and recovered through the depletion
(and depreciation) allowance on the property. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-i6
(a) (2). As to the meaning of the term "property", see note 21 infra.
7. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1O3, § 19.23 (m)-2. The purpose of these exclusions is to
limit the basis for depletion to the portion of cost, or other basis, attributable to the
well itself. Adjusted basis for gain or loss, as distinguished from the basis for deple-
tion, requires the determination of the basis of the entire property, with additional
adjustments for depreciation (to the extent allowed or allowable, whichever is greater)
and for items chargeable to capital account. INT. Rv. CODE §§ 113 (b) (i) (A), (B).
8. "Intangible drilling and development expenses," discussed in the next para-
graph, are not properly chargeable to capital account if previously deducted in com-
puting net income. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.113 (b) (i)-l.
9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-6.
Io. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-7. No revaluation is permitted, during
the continuance of the ownership under which the value was determined, except for
misrepresentation, fraud, or gross error as to any facts known on the date as of
which the valuation was made, and then only with the consent of the Commissioner.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (in) -8; see Lucky Tiger-Combination Gold Mining Co.
v. Crooks, 95 F. (2d) 885, 889 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ; cf. Rust-Owen Lumber Co. v.
Com'r, 74 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Cape Henry Syndicate, 3o B. T. A. 794
(1934). This revaluation must be distinguished from the revision of estimated recov-
erable units for the purpose of redetermining the depletion unit (not the depletion
basis). See note 17 infra.
ii. U. S. Treas. Reg. IO3, § 19.23 (m)-7.
12. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-i6. Costs which must be capitalized are
those by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily considered as having
a salvage value, such as the cost of actual materials in those structures which are
constructed in the wells and on the property, and the cost of drilling tools, pipe, casing,
tanks, engines, boilers, machines, etc. Costs which must be expensed include operation
and production expense, general overhead expense, taxes, and depreciation of drilling
equipment, though incurred during development. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §9 19.23
(m)-i16 (c) (1), (2). But see New Quincy Mining Co., 36 B. T. A. 376 (I937).
In computing excess profits net income for base period years, deductions for intangible
drilling and development costs are disallowed to the extent of the excess over 125% of
the average of such deductions for the four prior years, or the excess over the deduc-
tions of that class for the taxable year, whichever excess is less. INT. REv. CODE § 711
(b) (i) (I).
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hauling, supplies, etc. 13 The taxpayer may elect either to deduct these
items as current expense or to capitalize and recover them through
subsequent depletion and depreciation deductions.' 4 Of these items,
those applicable to clearing ground, draining, road making, surveying,
geological work, excavation, grading, and drilling, shooting and clean-
ing of wells are recoverable by depletion. Those for labor, fuel, re-
pairs, hauling and supplies applicable to the installation of casing and
equipment and in the construction on the property of derricks and
other physical structures are recoverable by depreciation. 15 Therefore,
the "basis" factor used in determining cost depletion is the adjusted
cost, or other statutory basis, attributable to the well, plus that portion
of capitalized intangible drilling and development expenses recoverable
through depletion.
The annual cost depletion deduction is computed by first distrib-
uting the basis among the units (barrels of oil, or thousands of cubic
feet of natural gas) remaining in the well as of the taxable year. This
provides the depletion unit. The depletion unit so determined is then
multiplied by the units sold within the taxable year. The result is
the cost depletion for the taxable year. The "number of units sold
13. Expenditures for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., in connection
with equipment, facilities, or structures, not incident to or necessary for the drilling
of wells, such as structures for storing or treating oil or gas, are capital items recov-
erable through the depreciation deduction. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1O3, § 19.23 (m)-16 (c)
(2). When the taxpayer contracts with an independent driller for a completed well
under a "turnkey contract", the amount paid to the driller is a capital cost, and no
part of the cost may be deducted at the option of the taxpayer. Hughes Oil Co. v.
Bass, 62 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 726 (1933) ; Har-
ris Co. v. Com'r, 112 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o); E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A. I59
(14o). The optional deduction is permitted, however, where the driller is in the em-
ploy of the taxpayer, W. D. Ambrose, 42 B. T. A. 1405 (1940); or where the ex-
penses "are incurred under a contract providing for the drilling of a well to an agreed
depth, or depths, at an agreed price per foot or other unit of measurement". U. S.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-I6 (a) (i). The Treasury recently proposed an amend-
ment to the Regulations regarding drilling costs. The producer is to capitalize his
costs whenever drilling is performed by an independent contractor, even on a footage
basis. Vigorous protest from the industry compelled a temporary postponement of
this proposed amendment. See Release, November 3, 1941, 413 C. C. H. Fed. Tax
Serv. 6580. As to the requirement that the drilling contractor capitalize costs
which result in his obtaining an "economic interest" in the oil or gas in place, see
Section XI infra.
14. The election must be made on the firt return, and is binding for all subsequent
years. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m) -16 (d). The propriety of granting this
election, as well as the reasonableness of requiring a binding election, has been ap-
proved. Vinton Petroleum Co. of Texas v. Com'r, 71 F. (2d) 420 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934), cert. dented, 293 U. S. 6oi (1934); Boone County Coal Corp. v. United
States, 37 F. Supp. 327 (D. W. Va. I94I), aff'd, 121 F. (2d) 988; California Coast
Oil Co., 25 B. T. A. 9o2 (1932); Fort Ring Oil & Gas Co., 3o B. T. A. 307 (934).
But the taxpayer may show that no binding election was intended or effected in its
return. Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) ; Callie
E. Robertson, 28 B. T. A. 635 01933).
I5. The distribution of these expenses between depreciable and depletable items
depends upon whether the amounts capitalized are represented by physical property or
not. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.23 (m) -16 (b) (I), (2) ; see United States v.
Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933). As to the importance of segregating
depreciable items where percentage depletion is being used by the taxpayer, see page
392 infra.
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within the taxable year," in the case of a taxpayer reporting on the
cash receipts and disbursements method, includes units for which pay-
ments were received within the taxable year although produced and sold
prior to the taxable year, and excludes units sold but not paid for in
the taxable year. Sales, not payment, is the factor for the taxpayer
on the accrual basis. In neither case does the phrase "number of units
sold within the taxable year" include units with respect to which deple-
tion deductions were allowed or allowable prior to the taxable year.
The number of units "remaining as of the taxable year" is the number
of units at the end of the year still to be recovered from the property
(including units recovered but not sold) plus the number of units sold
within the taxable year. 6 The determination of the content of the
well may be revised from year to year if warranted by development
work or operations.
1 7
As already stated, the taxpayer in oil and gas cases is not con-
fined to cost depletion. He may, if it produces a larger deduction, use
the percentage depletion method."' No permanent election is required
of the taxpayer, and he may adopt each year the method most advan-
tageous to him.19 This method permits a deduction in an arbitrary
amount equal to 272 7 of the "gross income from the property". In
no case, however, may the deduction exceed 50 of the "net income
from the property".
2 0
"Gross income from the property" is the selling price of the crude
oil or gas in the immediate vicinity of the well. 21 If the taxpayer
16. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19-23 (m)-2. In the case of gas wells, where the
annual production is not metered and is not capable of a reasonably accurate estimate,
the "decline in rock pressure" method is permitted. Id.
17. The estimate of total recoverable units must be made according to the method
current in the industry. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m) -9. The statute authorizes
the revision of the estimated recoverable units, for determining depletion for subse-
quent years, where such revised estimate is ascertained as a result of operations or
of development work. 17. REv. CODE § 23 (M). "Subsequent years" includes the
year in which the revision is made. U. S. Treas. Reg. IO3, § 19.23 (m)-9, as
amended by T. D. 5054, 1941-i Cumn. BuLL. 227. Significantly, the statute provides
that such revised estimate will not, however, affect "the basis for depletion." The
result is that a revision of the estimated recoverable reserve will rquire an upward or
downward revision of the depletion unit, but no change in the basis recoverable through
depletion. McCahill v. United States, 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 4 9634. (D. Minn. 941);
American Sulphur Royalty Co. of Texas, 34 B. T. A. 439 (1936) ; cf. McCahill v.
Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). As to the revision of basis where
predicated on value, see note io sulpra.
18. Percentage depletion may be taken though the taxpayer has no basis for gain
.or loss or for cost depletion. Louisiana Iron & Supply Company, Inc., 44 B. T. A.
1244 (1941); cf. Second Carey Trust, 41 B. T. A. 8oo (194o), where percentage
depletion was allowed though no evidence of cost depletion was introduced.
ig. INT. RE.v CODE §§ 114 (b) (3) ; 23 (m) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-4.
As to the information required to be attached to the return of a taxpayer who claims
percentage depletion, see U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m) -13.
20. INT. REv. CODE § 114 (b) (3).
21. The taxpayer's interest in each separate mineral property is a separate "prop-
erty". Vinton Petroleum Co. of Texas v. Com'r, 71 F. (2d) 42o C. C. A. 5th,
1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 6oi (x934). The term "property" means each separate
interest owned by the taxpayer in each separate tract or parcel of land, whether sepa-
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transports or processes the product, the representative "field price" of
the crude oil or gas, or in the absence of such field price the portion
of the selling price applicable to the crude oil or gas at the well, is
used. 2 Rents and royalties paid by the taxpayer are deducted in deter-
mining gross income from the property.23 Advance royalties, if de-
ducted from income for the taxable year, are deducted also for this
purpose.24 In addition, there is deducted the portion of any bonus,
paid which is allocable to the product sold during the taxable year.25
"Net income from the property" is the "gross income from the prop-
erty" less allowable deductions attributable or fairly allocable to the
mineral property, but not including depletion.2 6 Intangible drilling and
development costs optionally deducted from income by the taxpayer are
deducted in determining net income from the property.
2 7
Irrespective of the method of depletion adopted by the taxpayer,
he is permitted to recover the cost, or other basis, of improvements
and equipment. This recovery is accomplished through the deprecia-
rated geographically or by conveyance. It means also each different interest of the tax-
payer in the same tract, G. C. M. 22106, 1941-I Cum. Bum- 245. But two or more
mineral properties included in a single tract or parcel of land may be considered to be a
single property, provided such treatment is consistently followed. Jewel Mining Co.,
43 B. T. A. 1123 (I941). A "mineral property" is the mineral deposit, the development
and plant necessary for its extraction, and so much of the surface of the land neces-
sary for purposes of mineral extraction. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-I (b).
As used in the Regulations the term "minerals" includes oil and gas, but the term
"mine" does not include oil and gas wells. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3, §§ i9.23 (m)-i (d),(e). 22. "In the case of oil and gas, if the crude mineral product is not sold on the
property but is manufactured or converted into a refined product or is transported
from the property prior to sale, then the gross income from the property shall be
assumed to be equivalent to the market or field price of the oil or gas before conversion
or transportation". U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-I (f). "Gross income from
the property" does not include costs of production defrayed by the purchaser of the
product. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 3o3 U. S. 376 (1938).
23. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-I (f).
24. See Section VI infra.
25. See Section VII infra.
26. The allowable deductions include overhead and operating expenses, deprecia-
tion, taxes, losses sustained, etc., but exclude any allowance for depletion. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-I (g). These deductions have been held to include interest on
loans for development and equipment (Mirabel Quicksilver Co., 41 B. T. A. 4o1
(194o)) ; interest on loans to purchase producing property (St. Marys Oil & Gas
Co., 42 B. T. A. 270 (1940)) ; state income tax applicable to production (Grison Oil
Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1117 (1940)); full interest on income tax deficiencies, where the
taxpayer had other sources of income but no other "business" (Holly Development
Co., 4 B. T. A. 5i (1941)) ; cost of geological and land departments where deducted
as expense (G. C. M. 22W89, 1941-I Ctm. Bui.t. 225). The percentage depletion al-
lowance, as well as the net income limitation thereon, must be computed for each
depletable economic interest or property held by the taxpayer. G. C. M. 22956, 1941
INT. REv. BuLL. No. 46 at 2. As to the meaning of the term "property," see note 21
supra For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1940, the excess profits tax is
deductible in computing net income. Presumably, the portion of this tax allocable to the
property is deductible in computing "net income from the property". For the purpose
of the excess profits tax, however, the limitation is based upon the net income without
reduction by the excess profits tax. INT. REV. CODE § 711 (a) (i) (G), 711 (a) (2)
(I), both added by the Rev. Act of 1941 § 202 (d).
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. T03, § 19-23 (m)-i (g); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.
Inc., 308 U. S. 9o (1939). As to the option to capitalize or deduct these costs, see
note 14 mtpra.
392 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tion allowance. 28  It has already been noted that the portion of capi-
talized intangible drilling and development expenses attributable to
casing and equipment and in the construction on the property of der-
ricks and other physical structures is recoverable through deprecia-
tion.29  Segregation of depletable and depreciable property is partic-
ularly advantageous to the taxpayer when percentage depletion is
employed, since otherwise the depreciation of improvement costs would
be merged in the depletion allowance.8 0 In general, the depreciation
allowance is spread over the life of the equipment or improvement, or
the life of the depletable property, whichever is shorter.3 1
The application of these depletion formula present little theo-
retical difficulty, although a detailed and sometimes involved accounting
analysis may be required. The difficulty arises in determining who
obtains the depletion deduction, and when. If producing oil were
generally a one-man proposition, the judicial eye could be kept on the
entire venture and the depletion allowance could be easily relegated
to its correct relationship with the other parts. But the traffic in oil
and gas interests produces income which has no connection with actual
production. The depletion deduction must often be anticipated as well
as distributed. In such cases, the "who" and "when" of the depletion
deduction must be considered in connection with the income aspects of
the oil and gas relationships.
III. "SALE" BY LESSOR OR ASSIGNOR
When the owner of an interest in oil or gas property sells, leases,
subleases, or assigns such interest, or a part thereof, he immediately
acquires a set of tax problems. (The latent tax problems of his ven-
dee, lessee, sublessee, or assignee are reserved for subsequent discus-
sion.) If there is a taxable transaction, what is the measure of the
income? Is it ordinary income or is it capital gain? Is a depletion
deduction allowable?
Of the many factors which determine these answers, the most
important (and most troublesome) is whether or not the taxpayer
retained an "economic interest in the oil and gas in place." If the
taxpayer makes an outright sale of his entire oil and gas interest,
28. As to the deduction for depreciation (and obsolescence generally, see U. S.
Treas. Reg. lO3, §§ 19.23 (1)-I to (1) -io, inclusive. This deduction covers the physi-
cal property, such as machinery, tools, equipment, pipes, etc. U. S. Treas. Reg. lO3,
§ 19.2-3 (m)-18.
29. See note 15 sprvr.
30. See United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933).
31. The basis is equitably distributed over the useful life of the property so as to
bring such property to its true salvage value when no longer useful. But where the
reasonable expectation of the economic life of the oil or gas deposit is shorter than the
normal useful life, the deduction may be based upon the length of life of the deposit.
U. S. Treas. Reg. lO3, § 19.23 (m)-18.
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there is one set of answers. If he leases or assigns his interest, but
retains a fractional interest in the gross production for the life of the
lease, there is another set of answers. Between the two lies a twilight
zone in which the lines are still in the process of demarcation: the
retention of "oil payments" to be paid out of gross production, but
only until such time as a fixed aggregate of such payments is received.
A sale or exchange of property is ordinarily a taxable transaction,
provided that the income therefrom is "realized" within the taxable
year. If the owner of an oil and gas interest sells his entire interest
for a fixed amount, his gain or loss is the difference between that
amount and the "adjusted basis" of the property in his hands.32 Sup-
pose, however, that the selling price consists of a speculative interest
in the future production of the property. The accepted measure of
taxability upon an exchange is the "fair market value" of the property
or right received in exchange; but if such value is indeterminate, the
realization of income, or of gain or loss, is postponed until a subse-
quent realization upon the property or right acquired. 33  The courts
have been reluctant to apply a "fair market value" test to oil and gas
interests.. 4  Whether such valuation is grounded upon engineers' esti-
mates or upon actual purchase and sale figures, the attitude is under-
standable. There are few commodities with the inherent uncertainties
and fluctuations of an interest in oil property. To require an imme-
diate tax on a "gain" so essentially speculative is patently harsh. In
the long run, there is no prejudice to the revenues, and the courts are
disposed to require the Treasury to join the taxpayer in his gamble.
Will the same result follow if the taxpayer receives a cash pay-
ment in addition to a speculative interest in production or profits? On
32. INT. Rzv. CODE § iii. As to adjustment of basis for depletion allowed or al-
lowable, see note 6 mipra.
33. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931); Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 3oo
U. S. 481 (1937); Gould Securities Co. v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 780 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938). As to gain realized by a taxpayer on the cash basis, see Helvering v.
Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 7o F. (2d) 843 (App. D. C. 1934) ; I. T. 3485, 1941-I
Cu. Buu._ 240.
34. Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B. T. A. 38 (1940), caff'd, IIS F. (2d) 459
(C. C. A. 5th, 1941) cited note 52 infr; E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A. i59 (1940), apPeal
pe zding C. C. A. 5th, cited note 75 i4frcs; Kay Kinibell, 41 B. T. A. 940 (1940), cited
note 83 infra; Comr v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938),
aff'g 35 B. T. A. 341 (1937), cited note 87 infra;, cf. Midfield Oil Co. 39 B. T. A.
1154 (939), cited note 83 infra. In Robert J. Boudreau, 45 B. T. A. No. 70 (Oct.
21, 194I), the Board held, with four dissents, that a stockholder's gain on the liquida-
tion of a corporation includes the fair market value of oil payments received in the
liquidation. In Champlin Refining Co. v. Com'r, 123 F. (2d) 2o2 (C. C. A.
ioth, 1941), the taxpayer corporation was allowed a cost basis for depletion meas-
ured by the value of its stock given in payment for the oil interest, which value was in
turn predicated upon the value of the interest. This conclusion was reached in the face
of the court's prior decision that a stockholder had realized no gain upon the receipt
of that corporation's stock, since the stock had no "fair market value" on account of
pending litigation over title to the property. Champlin v. Com'r, 71 F. (2d) 23 (C. C.
A. ioth, 1934).
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the one hand, it does not seem entirely equitable that he should receive
a tax-free recovery of his entire cost before any part of the cash is
taxable. On the other hand, there seems no justification for a different
tax classification of a future indeterminate profit merely because it is
received together with cash. The Board and the courts have not quite
emerged from their tussle with this probem, but the results seem
clearly foreshadowed. The taxability of such a transaction depends
primarily upon the nature of the speculative interest. There is one
result if the taxpayer retains a royalty interest. There is another if
the taxpayer retains a right to oil payments. And there is still a third
if the taxpayer retains no "economic interest in the oil and gas in
place." In the first case, all of the cash is income (subject to deple-
tion) ; in the second, the taxpayer's basis is allocated between the inter-
est "sold" and the interest "retained"; in the third, the full basis of
the taxpayer's interest is set off against the realized payments before
there is any taxable gain from the transaction.
This is only one of the differences effected by the retention or
non-retention of an "economic interest in the oil or gas in place." De-
pendent upon the holding period of the asset, gain realized upon a sale
or exchange may be taxed at the more favorable rates applicable to
capital transactions. 35 This rule would apply to the sale of an oil
or gas interest for a fixed amount. But, again, the answer is not so
simple when the taxpayer receives an interest in production or profits.
It becomes further complicated when cash is received in addition to
such an interest. If a royalty interest is retained, both the cash and
the royalty constitute ordinary income. If an oil payment is reserved,
gain on the cash received is capital gain, whereas the income realized
as oil payments is ordinary income. Where no "economic interest"
is retained, the gain on the entire consideration would seem to be sub-
ject to the capital gain limitations.
There is still a third difference attributable to an "economic inter-
est" retained or not retained by the taxpayer. If an amount received
by the taxpayer represents income derived from the property (as dis-
tinguished from income derived from a disposition of the property)
he is entitled to a depletion allowance with respect to such income.
This means that the taxpayer is not entitled to set off the entire cost
of his interest against the first income realized. It means also, how-
ever, that a taxpayer with little or no cost may still be entitled to the
35. INT. Rav. CODE § 117. As to the special limitation upon individual surtax in
the case of a sale of oil or gas property, or any interest therein, where the principal
value of the property has been demonstrated by prospecting or exploration or discov-
ery work done by the taxpayer,' see INT. REv. COD § O5.
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arbitrary subsidy of the deduction for percentage depletion. If a royalty
interest is retained, both the royalties and a cash bonus are entitled
to depletion deductions. If an oil payment is reserved, the income
realized on the oil payments is subject to depletion, but a cash payment
is not. If no "economic interest" is retained, the taxpayer's income
is the full amount realized in excess of his basis.
In view of the issues summarized above, it is not strange that
taxpayers and the Treasury are continuously shifting position on what
constitutes an "economic interest". In one case, a taxpayer will argue
that he did not retain an interest, and is therefore entitled to a tax-free
recovery of cost. In a second case, the taxpayer is seeking the advan-
tage of the capital gain rates. In a third case, the taxpayer who has
no cost basis may be willing to forego the advantages of capital gain
in favor of a percentage depletion deduction.
With characteristic disregard of nomenclature, the tax law may
view a lessor as a vendor, and an assignor as the holder of an "eco-
nomic interest". The Supreme Court has stated that the consequences
of a lease or assignment are affected neither by state law,3 6 nor by "the
formalities of the conveyancer's art." 37 In commenting upon the qual-
ity of a lessor's interest required for a depletion allowance, the court
negatived the importance of the retention of ownership or any partic-
ular form of legal interest in the mineral content of the land: "It is
enough if by virtue of the leasing transaction, he has retained a right
to share in the oil produced. If so he has an economic interest in the
oil, in place, which is depleted by production." 38 And a lessee may
retain an "economic interest" upon his assignment of the leasehold in-
terest, if by the assignment he withheld a right to a fraction of the oil
to be produced.39 From these early pronouncements, there were
grounds for belief that a sale was effected only when the consideration
was a fixed cash payment, and that any lessor or assignor who acquired
a right* to payment dependent upon the operation of the property
retained an "economic interest in the oil and gas in place." The Su-
preme Court has since announced two important departures from such
a rule. No "economic interest" is retained by a person who conveys
36. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932). In that case it was argued that
a lease under Texas law constituted a sale of the oil and gas prior to severance from
the soil, and that a lump-sum payment received upon such a "sale" was subject to
the capital gain provisions. The court held that the retention by the lessee of an in-
terest in production precluded such interpretation, since the economic consequences
were the same as those of a lease in which title to the oil and gas did not pass before
severance.
37. Anderson v. Helvering, 31o U. S. 404, 411 (194o), cited note 41 infra.
38. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551, 557 (1933), cited note 46 infra.
39. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U. S. 655 (937), cited note 6o infra.
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his interest for a share in the net profits of production,40 nor by a per-
son who reserves an interest in the fee as security for oil payments.
41
Whether the exceptions in the last two cases produce a "workable
rule" is open to question. Each of these cases was a government vic-
tory. In one, a depletion deduction was denied to the transferor. In
the other, the payments were taxed as the transferee's income, on the
theory that the amounts turned over to the transferor represented the
cost of the transferee's interest. Conversely, then, the payments rep-
resent selling price to the transferor. It is somewhat anomalous that
such income should be subject to the capital gain limitations. With
the tremendous advantage which the capital gain rates afford today,
there may be, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's abjuration, a high
premium upon the "conveyancer's art". The plight of the transferee
in such a case will be more fully discussed in a later section. Mean-
while, it is only fair to note that a tax-conscious transferee will be
represented by his own conveyancer.
IV. RESERVATION OF ROYALTIES BY LESSOR OR ASSIGNOR
Of the various types of interests which may be reserved by a
transferor, two result in the retention of an "economic interest in the
oil and gas in place." For tax purposes, the "royalty" interest is the
simpler. The "oil payment" interest will be discussed in the next sec-
tion.
A royalty is a fractional interest in the gross production of the
oil or gas. This is the interest customarily reserved by the owner of
the property when he leases the mineral rights. It is unlimited in
amount, and operates for the life of the lease. By its terms, the roy-
alty owner is not required to share in drilling or development costs,
nor in the costs of operation. The royalty interest is generally collected
by the ultimate producer of the oil and gas, and turned over to the
40. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co., 303 U. S. 372 (1938) ; Blanken-
ship v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). The same conclusion was
reached in Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U. S. 370 (1938), where there was the addi-
tional factor that the cash and percentage of net profits were received by the taxpayer
as consideration for stock of a corporation which owned the producing property. See
G. C. M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214, 223-224, disapproving Reynolds v. McMurray,
6o F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. Ioth, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 664 (1932).
41. Anderson v. Ielvering, 310 U. S. 404 (194o). The transferor, noted the
court, "is not dependent entirely upon the production of oil for the deferred payments;
they may be derived from sales of the fee title to the land conveyed. . . . It is similar
to the reservation in a lease of oil payment rights together with a personal guarantee
by the lessee that such payments shall at all events equal the specified sum. . . . In
the interests of a workable rule, Thomas v. Perkins must not be extended beyond
the situation in which, as a matter of substance, without regard to formalities of con-
veyancing, the reserved payments are to be derived solely from the production of
oil and gas". Anderson v. Helvering, supra at 412-413. Cf. E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A.
159 (1940), appeal penOng, C. C. A. 5th, holding that a lien against production is not
equivalent to a lien against the property.
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lessor; but it may be paid directly by the purchaser of the product to
the lessor. The royalty is usually stated as a percentage of the gross
value of production, but may even be fixed as a fraction of the oil in
kind, at the surface of the well. Generally, the term "royalty" is re-
stricted to the interest retained by the lessor, but a similar interest (an
"overriding royalty") may be retained by the lessee, or by his sub-
lessee or assignee, in subsequent conveyances of the oil and gas inter-
est.4
2
Royalty income is ordinary income, essentially the same as rental
income from property. The important difference between the two, how-
ever, is that the royalties are paid with respect to a depleting interest in
the oil and gas in place. The royalty recipient, therefore, is entitled
to a depletion deduction as an offset against his income. Where cost
depletion is employed, the deduction represents a pro rata return of
the taxpayer's cost attributable to the producing property. Where per-
centage depletion is more advantageous, the effect is to subject but
72317 of the royalty income to tax, regardless of the taxpayer's cost.
In the same category as royalties are "advance royalties" and
fixed bonuses which are payable each year regardless of production.
43
But such payments differ from "delay rentals" paid by a lessee or
assignee for the privilege of postponing development beyond the date
fixed in the lease. The latter payments are taxable as ordinary income
to the lessor or assignor, but are not subject to depletion.
44
If a lessor or assignor receives a lump-sum cash payment in addi-
tion to the royalty right, such a bonus is treated as an "advance roy-
alty", despite the fact that the amount of the bonus is not to be de-
ducted from the amount of the royalties. The amount of the bonus,
therefore, is ordinary income in the hands of the lessor or assignor,
42. A somewhat confusing cross-current of definitions has been recognized for
personal holding company surtax liability. "Personal holding company income" in-
cludes, within certain limitations, "mineral, oil, or gas royalties." INT. REV. CoDn
§ 502 (h). Overriding royalties are not included in this provision, nor are they in-
cluded in "royalties (other than mineral, oil, or gas royalties)." U. S. Treas. Reg.
103, § 19.502-1 (3), (11). A true "advance royalty" chargeable against future pro-
duction is a "mineral, oil, or gas royalty." Logan Coal and Timber Association, 42
B. T. A. 529 (1940). But a bonus or rent payable regardless of production is not. J.
Howard Porter, 42 B. T. A. 681 (194o); I. T. 3401, 194o-2 Cum. BuLu. 166. The
term includes only amounts received for an interest reserved by a taxpayer, not a "par-
ticipating interest" acquired in consideration of the furnishing of drilling equipment.
Kiesau Petroleum Corp., 42 B. T. A. 69 (194o).
43. The Regulations require that depletion be taken against advance royalties
in the year in which payment is received, not in the subsequent year in which the pro-
duction occurs. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19-23 (m) -io (b). As to fixed annual
bonuses not chargeable against future production, see Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B. T. A.
277 (1941).
44. J. T. Sneed, Jr., 33 B. T. A. 478 (1935). This rule has been applied to "ex-
tension payments" received prior to production, although identical amounts were to
be paid as "advance royalties" upon the commencement of production. Continental
Oil Co., 36 B. T. A. 693 (1937).
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not proceeds of a "sale". 45 Since the bonus is treated as derived from
the transferor's remaining interest in the property, the bonus is sub-
ject to a depletion deduction.40 In the computation of depletion on
the cost method, the deduction consists of the portion of the taxpayer's
basis allocable to the bonus; the taxpayer is not permitted to set off
his entire cost against the bonus. t
If to his adyantage, the taxpayer is entitled to deduct percentage
depletion from bonus income.48 In allowing this deduction, the Su-
preme Court overruled the Bureau's position that percentage depletion
on a bonus was allowable only if there was actual production within
the taxable year, or if "future production was practically assured
because of nearby wells and geological indications." 49 The govern-
ment has since won a partial and roundabout victory on this issue.
If the lease is subsequently terminated without any oil having been
produced, percentage depletion (in excess of cost) allowed in a prior
year on account of a bonus must be reported as income in the year
the lease is terminated. 50  Nevertheless, if there has been some pro-
duction (apparently, no matter how small), the deduction need not be
restored to income upon the termination of the lease.51 Granted that
the Treasury and the courts are understandably tempted to whittle
45. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
46. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (933). To acquire the characteristics of an
"advance royalty", a bonus must be received in connection with the transaction by
which a royalty interest was reserved. Thus, in Badger Oil Co., 42 B. T. A. 521
(1940), aff'd, 118 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), rehearing denied, May IO, 1941,
cert. denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 67 (1941), depletion was denied with respect to a lump sum
received by a lessee upon the assignment of the lease, although the lessee had previ-
ously acquired a share of the lesscr's royalty rights.
47. The portion of the taxpayer's basis allocable to the bonus is measured by the
ratio which the amount of the bonus bears to the sum of the bonus and the royalties
expected to be received. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-lo (a). Where at the
time the bonus is received there is no showing that the bonus plus expected royalties
will exceed the taxpayer's basis, the full bonus is applied in recoupment of cost. In
such a case, the practical effect of the bonus is the same as though it represented
the proceeds of a "sale". Where a lessor has thus recouped his cost, he may not
thereafter claim any part of such cost as a basis for cost depletion against the royal-
ties. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932).
48. Herring v. Com'r, 293 U. S. 322 (1934).
49. G. C. M. 11384, XII-I CuM. BULL. 64.
50. "If for any reason any grant of mineral rights expires or terminates or is
abandoned before the mineral which has been paid for in advance has been extracted
and removed, the grantor shall adjust his capital account by restoring thereto the
depletion deductions made in prior years on account of royalties on mineral paid for
but not removed, and a corresponding amount must be returned as income for
the year in which such expiration, termination, or abandonment occurs". U. S. Treas.
Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m).Io (c) ; Sneed v. Com'r, 11g F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 5th, 194),
rehearing denied, 121 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), aff'g 4o B. T. A. 1136 (1939) ;
Lamont v. Com'r, 12o F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) ;Grace M. Barnett, 39 B. T.
A. 864 (1939). Whether such income is reportable where the taxpayer derived no tax
benefit from the deduction in the prior year (e. g. where other deductions exceeded
the gross income) seems still an open question. See National Bank of Commerce of
Seattle, 4o B. T. A. 72 (1939). ;Contra: G. C. M. 22163, 1940-2, Cum BULL. 76.
51. Dolores Crabb, 41 B. T. A. 686 (1940), affd, 119 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941), remanded on othwr issue, 121 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). The Circuit
Court noted that the Commissioner had not appealed on this issue, and expressly with-
held opinion as to the rule.
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away the subsidy which Congress has granted, the shavings should
be somewhat more substantial-and somewhat less absurd.
V. RESERVATION OF OIL PAYMENTS BY LESSOR OR ASSIGNOR
In the last two sections we have detailed the consequences of a
"sale", and the consequences of a retention of an "economic interest
in the oil and gas in place." We conie now to the hybrid subject of
oil payments.
An "oil payment" reserved by a lessor or assignor is similar to
a royalty, in that it represents a fractional interest in the gross pro-
duction from the property. Its point of difference is that it is pay-
able only until a fixed aggregate of money or oil has been received.
If the transferor reserves an oil payment as consideration for the trans-
fer, and does not receive any lump-sum payment, his status is the
same as that of a royalty owner.52 The payments, when realized, are
ordinary income and are subject to a deduction for depletion. The
taxpayer is not entitled to recoup his entire cost from the first payments
received. 58
The complications arise when the lessor or assignor receives
a lump-sum payment, together with the right to oil payments. If he
reserves a royalty, as well as an oil payment, a lump-sum payment is
taxable as any other bonus received in connection with the reservation
of a royalty.54 But if the only interest retained is an oil payment,
the lump-sum payment is divorced from the "economic interest" still
held by the taxpayer. One Circuit Court has refused to distinguish
between a royalty and any other interest in this respect,55 and the Su-
52. Thomas v. Perkins, 30 U. S. 55 (1937); cf. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land
Development Co., 303 U. S. 372 (1938), cited note 40 supra; Anderson v. Helvering,
310 U. S. 404 (1940), cited note 41 supra. As in the case of other contingent pay-
ments out of production (whether royalties, oil pmenents, or "selling price"), the
present value of the right is not income when it is acquired; income is realized only
when the production occurs. Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B. T. A. 38 (1940), af'd,
118 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); see note 34 .rupra.
53. T. W. Lee, 4 B. T. A. 1217 (1940) ; see E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A. i59 (1940),
appeal pending, C. C. A. 5th, holding that the realization of oil payment rights was
income subject to depletion, and that the taxpayer was not entitled to recoup the value
of the rights as of the date he received them in the liquidation of a corporation; cf.
Com'r v. Laird, 91 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), and 0. Kenneth Hickman, 44
B. T. A. 1242 (941), holding that the estate tax value of oil payment rights trans-
mitted to the taxpayer by death may be recouped from the first proceeds, although
royalties are taxable income subject only to a depletion deduction.
54. Marrs McLean, 41 B. T. A. 565 (940), aff'd, 20 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th,
i94i). In Cullen v. Com'r, ii8 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), rev'g 41 B. T. A.
1054 (1940) and in Com'r v. West Production Co., 121 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941),
re7,g 41 B. T. A. io43 (940), the Board had found an indivisible assignment of vari-
ous leases reserving oil payments, in some of which royalties had also been -reserved.
The Board held, therefore, that depletion was allowable against all cash payments
received by the taxpayer. The reversal was based upon the court's conclusion that
the leases should have been segregated.
55. Elbe Oil Land Development Co. v. Com'r, 91 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 9 th,
1937), re/d, 303 U. S. 372 (1938), cited note 40 supra, on the ground that the re-
400 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
preme Court has not yet passed upon the issue. Nevertheless, the Bu-
reau, the Board and two Circuit Courts have established what may
safely be regarded as the prevailing rule. This rule recognizes the oil
payment as an "economic interest in the oil and gas in place," so that
the income realized from the oil payments themselves is ordinary
income, subject to depletion. On the other hand, it recognizes a "sale"
of that part of the transferor's interest not represented by the oil pay-
ment right, so that the lump-sum payment is not ordinary income and
is not subject to depletion.56 In other words, an oil payment by itself
(or in conjunction with a royalty) has all of the tax characteristics
of a royalty; but, because of the ceiling on the aggregate return, it is
not a strong enough "economic interest" to impart its own character-
istics to a bonus. As a makeshift compromise of the perplexing dis-
tinction between "sale" and "income", perhaps this is as logical as any
other result. Yet, it seems hardly in consonance with sound tax philos-
ophy to construct a rule which permits a taxpayer, without materially
altering his transaction, to shift the tax consequences to his own
advantage.
57
The remaining question, then, is the formula for computing the
gain or loss represented by the lump-sum payment. Since part of the
transferor's original interest is still represented by the oil payment
right retained, he may not apply his entire cost against the lump-sum
payment. He is entitled, however, to recover out of that payment the
entire depreciated cost of any physical equipment sold by him in the
transaction.5" His remaining basis is then allocated between the por-
tion of that interest which lie "sold", and the portion of that interest
which he "retained". This allocation is in the ratio of the respective
values of those interests at the time of the transaction. 9
served interest itself did not constitute an "economic interest". In Heep Oil Corp. v.
United States, 32 F. Supp. 762 (Ct. Cl. i94o), the court held that an assignor claiming
cost depletion on its oil payments must ,concede prior depletion on the cash payment
received.
56. Com'r v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Mamie S. Hammonds,
38 B. T. A. 4 (0938), aff'd on. this iysme, io6 F. (2d) 42o (C. C. A. ioth, 1939);
G. C. M. 22730, 1941-I Cumt. BULL. 214.
57. For example, if a transferor who would ordinarily reserve a royalty wishes
to obtain a capital gain with respect to a bonus, he need merely convert the royalty
into an oil payment by setting a limit upon his return-a limit which is safely in
excess of the expected return. See Eaton, Taxation of Oil Payinentts (194i) i9 Taxes
661, 664. Of course, the fixing of a fantastic sum would probably result in the disre-
gard of the distinction, but an amount within the upper limits of possible production
would be difficult to ignore. It may be noted that here is the perfect opportunity for
the unilateral functioning of the "conveyancer's art", since the transferee's tax liability
cannot be adversely affected by the result (compare text page 403 infra).
58. Thomas v. Peckham Oil Co., 115 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 5th, 194o); Columbia
Oil & Gas. Co., 41 B. T. A. 38 (I94O), affd, 1i8 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
59. Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B. T. A. 38 (1940), affd, 118 F. (2d) 459 (C. C.
A. 5th, 194i). In that case the taxpayer attempted to increase the basis attributable
to the cash payment by employing a ratio based on quantities of oil. It allocated to
the reserved oil payments only a sufficient number of barrels to satisfy the oil pay-
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The discussion of transferor's income may be best concluded by
reverting to the lessor and assignors of our example. Mr. Farmer
leased the mineral rights of his ranch for $50,000 cash plu a 8 roy-
alty. The $50,000 is taxable as ordinary income, but is subject to a
27Y27% depletion allowance.
Mr. Speculator assigned his Y interest for $8o,ooo in cash plus
a $200,000 oil payment out of 1/16 of production. The $8oooo is
not income from the property, nor is his gain limited to the $30,000
cash profit. If we assume that the oil payment has a present value of
$4o,ooo, his $50,000 investment must be allocated in the ratio 8o :4o.
His basis for computing gain on the $8o,ooo cash received is therefore
only two-thirds of $5o,ooo, or $33,333.33, and the resulting profit is
$46,666.67. The remaining basis of $16,666.67 is theoretically recov-
erable via cost depletion, although that deduction will more probably
be computed by the percentage method.
Mr. Promoter assigned the Y interest (less the 1/16 oil pay-
ment) for $8o,ooo (the same amount that he invested) plus a Y8 roy-
alty and a $iooooo oil payment out of 1/16 of production. Because
he retained a royalty as well as an oil payment, the $8o,ooo is ordinary
income. No part of the $8o,ooo investment may be deducted from
such income, except by way of the depletion deduction. The remain-
ing investment is still available for cost depletion against the royalties
and oil payments.
And so we pass to the ultimate owner of the working interest,
and to the converse of the problems discussed above.
VI. PRODUCTION PAYMENTS AND THE PRODUCER
The tax pattern for the oil producer is shaped very largely by the
interests of his various predecessors in title. As we have seen, the oil
and gas rights of a parcel of land may reach the ultimate holder of the
working interest in an extremely fractional state. He has probably
given a cash payment and some form of an interest in production to
his immediate assignor. In addition, he may be the conduit for vari-
ous production rights retained by vendors, lessors, sublessors and
assignors in the chain of title. These rights may fall within or with-
out the magic phrase "economic interest in the oil and gas in place."
merts; the remainder of the estimated quantity of oil in place was allocated to the
interest sold. The Board rejected this formula, and adopted an allocation based upon
values. For the value of the entire property, it accepted a value stipulated by the
parties; for the value of the interest sold, it took the actual cash payment received
by the assignor for his interest. In Com'r v. Roeser and Pendleton, Inc., 118 F. (2d)
462 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), the court pointed out that an allocation was impossible
where the facts did not disclose a basis for valuation; the employment of the face-
amount of the oil payment was held improper.
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Let us first consider the royalties and oil payments which The
Big Gusher Development Co. passes on to Messrs. Farmer, Speculator
and Promoter. From the latter, it will be recalled, the company
acquired a 4 working interest, subject to two 1/16 oil payments. For
the moment we may disregard the $8o,ooo lump-sum payment, as
well as the various payments to the drilling contractor and to the
'investor. Assume that the gross production of oil for the taxable
year is $320,000. Of this amount, a $4oooo royalty is paid to Mr.
Farmer, a $20,000 oil payment to Mr. Speculator, and a $4o,ooo roy-
alty and a $20,000 oil payment to Mr. Promoter. Does the company's
gross income include any part of the $120,000 thus paid? As has
been demonstrated above, each of these payments is with respect to an
''economic interest in the oil and gas in place." The income is treated
as derived directly from the property by the ultimate payees. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the income is not that of the producer
merely because it happened to flow through his hands.60 And from
this it follows that the producer's "gross income from the property"
does not include these payments for the purpose of computing per-
centage depletion.
61
A peculiar status is accorded "advance royalties" by the Regu-
lations. So far as the payee is concerned, such payments are con-
cededly income from the property, subject to a depletion allowance. If
the analogy to ordinary royalties were followed in the case of the
producer, the production income attributable to the advance royalty
would constitute an exclusion from gross income in the year such
income was realized. Instead, the Treasury terms the payment a
deduction from gross income, and offers the taxpayer an election as
to the year when that deduction may be taken. The item may be
deducted on the return for the year in which the advance was paid
or accrued; or, if no election is expressed in the return, the item is
deductible when the product with respect to which the royalty was
paid is sold. 62 The latter treatment is unquestionably the more con-
6o. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U. S. 655 (1937). A dissenting opinion by Justices
Stone and Cardozo insisted that an oil payment made to the assignor was taxable to
the assignee; the payment represented merely purchase price for the assignee's interest,
whatever might be the tax effect upon the assignor. See Anderson v. Helvering, 31o
U. S. 404 (I94O), cited note 41 s1,ra. In American Liberty Oil Co., 43 B. T. A. 76
(I94O), appeal pending, C. C. A. 5th, oil payments made to the lessor and lessee by
the producer were held not taxable income to the producer, where an intervening
assignee-assignor reserved a lien on the leasehold equipment. The Board pointed
out that the payments in question were not made to that person, but to persons who
retained no rights except from oil production.
61. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312 (934).
62. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (in) -Io (e). This election was required to be
made in the return for the first taxable year ending on or after December 31, 1939,
and such election is binding for all future years. For years ending prior to December
31, 1939, the Treasury apparently recognized the "deduction" only in the year of the
production against which the advance royalty was chargeable.
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sistent. Yet, the election to treat the payment as a fixed periodic
deduction, in the nature of rent, is a privilege to which a realistic
taxpayer seems justifiably entitled. 8 For the purpose of the per-
centage depletion deduction, "gross income from the property" is re-
duced by the amount of advance royalties in the year in which they
are deducted by the taxpayer.
64
VII. BONUS PAYMENTS BY PRODUCER
It has been noted that a lump-sum payment received by a lessor
or assignor may be taxed either as ordinary income or as capital gain
in his hands. So far as the transferee is concerned, however, the tax
consequences are the same in either case. "In the case of the payor
any payment made for the acquisition of an economic interest in a min-
eral deposit or standing timber constitutes a capital investment in the
property recoverable only through the depletion allowance." 05 There
can be no quarrel with this statement, though its ending might more
informatively have been: "recoverable, if at all, only through the de-
pletion allowance." For it is clear that a taxpayer to whom percentage
depletion is more advantageous will not derive a dollar's worth of tax
benefit from a $iooooo bonus payment.
The Treasury, however, has not been content to leave such a tax-
payer in status quo. It actually penalizes him for the original cost
which he incurred in obtaining his interest, if that cost was a depletable
"bonus" in the hands of the transferor.' In determining "gross income
from the property" for percentage depletion, the taxpayer is required
to deduct the portion of the bonus allocable to the product sold during
the taxable year. 66 That portion of the bonus, it is said, is equivalent
to a royalty paid to the transferor; and a royalty is concededly deducti-
ble from production income in computing the producer's "gross income
from the property." The proof of such equivalence is that the bonus
was taxable as ordinary income to the transferor, and was subject to
a depletion deduction in his hands.
Thus, if The Big Gusher Development Co. had paid Mr. Pro-
moter only $4o,ooo as the cash consideration for the assignment, its
future income taxes would be lower than they will be as a result of the
$8o,ooo payment. If this perverse conclusion is correct, then the tax
law has indeed lost touch with reality. The error, of course, is in the
63. See Burnet v. Hutchinson Coal Co., 64 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933);
Com'r v. Jamison Coal & Coke Co., 67 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
64. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.23 (m)-I (f).
65. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m)-io (a).
66. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (m) -I (f); Quintana Petroleum Co., 44
B. T. A. 624 (i94i).
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false analogy. A producer is denied depletion on production income
paid over as royalties because such income is not taxable to him.
67 It
is another matter to deny depletion on production income, taxable to
the producer, merely because he has paid out his own money. No
deflection of income accompanied such payment, nor was any other
tax advantage derived therefrom. That a cost of this type should
adversely affect all subsequent depletion deductions of the taxpayer
is a result which requires prompt correction.
VIII. PRODUCTION PAYMENTS AS PRODUCER'S COST
We have seen that not all payments from production constitute
income from the property in the hands of a lessor or assignor. A
"secured" oil payment, for example, is taxable to the assignor as the
selling price of his interest. Conversely, then, the payment represents
purchase price to the assignee. The production income which the
assignee devotes to such a payment is taxable to him. 68  Physically, of
course, he may be merely a conduit for such income, in precisely the
same manner as he is a conduit for royalties and true oil payments.
Nevertheless, the income is his own, with a depletion deduction as the
only offsetting item. Since the payments constitute a capital invest-
ment, there can be no deduction for these payments as an "ordinary and
necessary business expense." 69
It would be pleasantly simple to dismiss the producer's problem
at this point. The rulings and cases appear to find no difficulty with
such a dismissal: the producer's taxable income which he turns over
to an assignor represents cost to him, and such cost is recoverable by
depletion deductions spread over the life of the property. In the first
place, of course, this cost affects the depletion deduction only if de-
pletion is computed by the cost method. Otherwise, this cost is merged
in the percentage depletion deduction, and the tax originally paid on
such cost is a complete loss to the taxpayer. For this reason alone, a
producer should be wary of entering into any contract wherein his
predecessors obtain a share of production but not an "economic inter-
est in the oil and gas in place."
In the second place, the effect of such payments upon cost deple-
tion is not easily predictable. The result may depend upon a further
67. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312 (1934), cited note 6i
supra.
68. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U. S. 404 (940), cited note 41 s=pra.
69. Quintana Petroleum Co., 4 B. T. A. 624 (1941). Minimum royalties com-
monly payable in mining leases are usually deductible as expenses (see note 63 mtpra) ;
but where the taxpayer lessee had the option to apply such royalties against "pur-
chase price", the deduction was disallowed. Goldfields of America, Ltd., 44 B. T. A.
2oo (ig4); see Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Com'r, 99 F. (2d) gig (C. C. A.
4th, 1938) ; cf. Jordan Creek Placers, 43 B. T. A. 131 (1940).
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analysis of the type of payment in question. If the payments are true
"guaranteed" oil payments, the producer's cost basis at the date of the
assignment should include the face amount of his obligation, since
that amount would seem to be the equivalent of a purchase money
mortgage issued by any purchaser of property. In that case, of course,
the payments are merely in discharge of the initial obligation, and
produce no annual change in the depletion basis. The difficulty arises,
however, in cases where there is no "obligation" of the producer which
may be considered a "cost" at the inception of his interest.' 0  Suppose,
for example, that the interest reserved by the assignor is a share of
the net profits of production. It is unlikely that the producer would
be permitted to capitalize the assignor's estimated share of such net
profits at the time of the assignment, and thus to compute his annual
cost depletion allowances on such a highly speculative basis. The pro-
ducer's only alternative, apparently, is to increase his cost basis, year
by year, as these payments of "purchase price" are made. This result,
however justified by the niceties of tax logic, creates a fantastic dis-
tribution of the depletion deduction over the life of the property. The
producer obtains an increasing cost against a depleting capital asset.
As the oil and gas is extracted, the producer's cost increases, with the
result that the maximum cost basis is obtained precisely in time for
the final depletion allowance.
A simfle hypothetical case will illustrate this conclusion. Let us
take first an owner-producer whose producing property costs $IOO,-
ooo and has an estimated yield of i,ooo,ooo barrels. If this property
produces 2oo,ooo barrels per year, the $ioo,ooo cost will be recovered
'(disregarding percentage depletion) in five annual depletion deduc-
tions of $2o,ooo each. Now let us take the same producer and the
same property, but add the factor of a production payment to an as-
signor who retains no "'economic interest". For simplicity we will
assume that each barrel is sold for one dollar and that twenty-five cents
of each dollar is paid to the assignor. Our producer, then, is paying
tax on $5o,ooo each year which he is turning over to his assignor.
Again disregarding percentage depletion, how does he recover that
$250,ooo additional "cost"? If this $5o,ooo is added to the remain-
ing cost basis as of the beginning of each year in which the payment
is made, the five annual depletion allowances on that cost would be,
roughly, $IO,OOO, $22,000, $4o,ooo, $64,ooo, and $114,000. It is
70. In Anderson v. Helvering, 31o U. S. 404 (1940), for example, the oil pay-
ment right of the assignor was "secured", but not "guaranteed" by the assignee. There
is considerable doubt whether such an "obligation" may constitute cost for deprecia-
tion or depletion prior to the actual payments thereon. See Midtown Tower, Inc.,
4o B. T. A. i6 (1939).
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difficult to imagine a more preposterous distribution of deductions
against a constant income.
The tax inequities of such a computation are too plainly evident.
The producer is paying tax in the early years on income which has
never really been his, and obtains the compensating depletion allow-
ance in the later years when the deduction probably exceeds his net
income. Moreover, if the actual mineral content of the property falls
short of the estimate, he has accumulated a large cost basis to be
written off as a loss in a year when there is no production income. On
the other hand, this discrepancy may not operate entirely against the
taxpayer. In the example above, percentage depletion was disregarded.
In his first two years, the producer might advantageously take his
deduction of 272 7 of the $2ooooo gross income from the property.
To the extent, therefore, that the inadequate cost depletion in those
years is covered by percentage depletion, the producer has preserved
a potential cost depletion deduction for later years.
This then, is the reductio ad absurdum of a perfectly plausible
chain of tax logic. The fault would seem to lie in the "workable rule"
by which the courts have distinguished between income and selling
price. By the standards of plain common sense, the receipt of income
which does not belong to the taxpayer is not a realization of taxable
income. Exceptions to that rule of common sense should be sparingly
applied. A proper exception is where such income is devoted to the
acquisition of a capital asset. But where the asset being "purchased"
is a depleting asset, and where the "cost" is paid from the very pro-
duction income which causes the depletion, the purchase theory is at
best artificial, and at worst pernicious. An overhauling of this con-
cept, however, is a staggering undertaking. It affects the measure of
income of both transferor and transferee; it affects the distinction
between ordinary income and capital gain; and it affects the depletion
deduction. It is safe to predict that the structure will be preserved,
and that the props of equity, if not of consistency, will in time be
pressed against the more vulnerable joints.
IX. PRODUCTION RIGHTS GRANTED BY PRODUCER
Up to this point there have been considered the conventional oil
and gas relationships of vendor-vendee, lessor-lessee, and lessee-
assignee. The "economic interests" have been limited to those reserved
by the lessor and intermediate owners of the lease. To be entitled to
depletion, those persons are apparently required to retain the right to
a share of the gross proceeds of production. Obviously, however, this
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test is not applicable to the "economic interest" of the producer. The
latter is the person who occupies and operates the producing property,
and incurs the cost of production; it is unimportant whether he is
denominated a lessee or a contractor, so long as he has the right to
extract the mineral from the ground and to retain a share of the pro-
ceeds.71 But the producer is not necessarily at the end of the chain of
"economic interests". Without relinquishing his status, the producer
may contract for a partial operation of the property by another. An
example which has at least twice reached the courts is that of the cas-
inghead contractor, whose function is to remove -wet gas at the cas-
ingheads, or "traps" at the mouth of the well, and to separate that
gas into its components of gasoline and dry gas. In both cases, the
contractor was to share the production income with the producer. In
the first case, the contractor was allowed depletion against its share of
the wet gas production, based upon its right to enter upon the land
and to assist in the actual extraction. 72  In a subsequent case, the Su-
preme Court denied depletion to the contractor on the ground that
its status was that of a "processor", not a producer; a mere "eco-
nomic advantage" from production is insufficient.73  The producer's
own computation has not been before the courts. It would seem, how-
ever, that the contractor's share of the gas production would not be
included in the producer's "gross income from the property." 74 The
result, therefore, is that something less than ioo% of the production
income from the property is subject to percentage depletion.
Two groups of cases involving the granting of production rights
by the producer have been frequently in litigation. The drilling of
wells is commonly performed by an independent contractor, and the
71. ". . . the Oil Company, whether technically it became a sub-lessee or not,
acquired an economic interest in the oil and gas in place identical with that of a lessee
...Though referred to in the agreement as a "contractor", the Oil Company was not
. a mere contractor for hire. It had the right to, and did, occupy the leased prop-
erty and produce oil and gas therefrom. It had the right to, and did, receive and
retain as its own 61 2/3% of the net proceeds of the oil and gas so produced ....
The possessor of such rights cannot be regarded as a mere hireling." Spalding v.
United States, 97 F. (2d) 697, 700 (C. C. A. 9th, i938).
72. Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Corr, 66 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933). The
various factors recited by the court "make the conclusion inevitable that the petitioner
was to have an interest, not only in such gas as might naturally rise and be caught in
the casing heads, but that this right extended to all the gas that petitioner might be
able to reduce to possession by drawing it to the surface and into its plant". Signal
Gasoline Corp. v. Com'r, supra at 889.
73. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362 (1938). The court carefully
omitted any reference to the Signal case, but said, "Respondent had the right to have
the gas delivered, but did not produce it and could not compel production. The pipe
lines and equipment, which respondent provided, facilitated the delivery of the gas
produced but the agreement for their installation granted no interest in the gas in
place . . .. Undoubtedly, respondent through its contracts obtained an economic
advantage from the production of the gas, but that is not sufficient". Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., supra at 368. For a thorough differentiation of the facts in the two
cases, see the Board opinion at 33 B. T. A. 9io, 914 (1936).
74. U. S. Treas. Reg. Io3, § I9.23 (m)-i (f).
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latter's payment is often an oil payment right or a "participating inter-
est" in the property. Or, drilling and development are financed by
outside capital, with an interest in production as the consideration for
the money. The producer's fundamental problem in both cases is
whether the nature of the transaction is such that income is realizable.
Where all that the producer receives is a completed well, the result-
ing enhancement of the producer's interest is not taxable income.75 This
conclusion is in line with the general unwillingness of the courts to
anticipate production income: there is time to exact the tax when pro-
duction actually occurs. A similar result obtains where the producer
receives cash for the purpose of drilling a well, provided that the in-
vestor receives his production rights in the specific well to be developed
with that cash."' In that case, the money is regarded as a contribution
to the "reservoir of capital" in the producing property. In the absence
of this restriction, however, the money may constitute a payment to
the producer as a taxpaying entity, rather than to the joint investment.
What is the measure of the producer's income in such a case, and
what is its nature?
It will be recalled that a lessor or assignor who reserves a royalty
and receives a cash bonus is deemed to receive the bonus as ordinary
income from the property, subject to depletion. The producer who
transfers a production right for cash would seem to be in the same
position. In both cases, the transferor has retained an economic inter-
est, and in both cases the transferor's potential income from produc-
tion has been reduced by the transfer. The income of the lessor or
assignor is considered an advance payment attributable to the interest
retained by him, rather than proceeds from the sale of the interese
conveyed. The producer, on the other hand, is held to have received
the investor's money as the proceeds of a sale.7 7  The result is that
the amount received in excess of the cost allocable to the interest sold
is taxable as capital gain.
7 8
75 E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A. 359 (194o), appeal pending, C. C. A. 5th. As to the
nondeductibility of drilling costs under a "turnkey contract", see note 13 mtpra.
76. Transcalifornia Oil Co., 37 B. T. A. 119 (1938).
77. Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., 83 F. (2d) 42o (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), cert.
denied 299 U. S. 574 (1936). In that case, the taxpayer financed the drilling of a well
by the sale of an undivided interest in that well. The full amount received was held
taxable, since there was no showing as to the amount actually used for drilling, nor
could the court find an obligation on the part of the taxpayer to use the funds for the
benefit of the investors or to return any unused balance to them. In United States v.
Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 83 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), the taxpayer proved
that the amounts it received were used for drilling various wells, but income was held
realized because there was no proof that the amounts were used in proportion to each
investor's interest in each well. 'In Rawco, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 128 (1938), income was
held realized where the financing occurred after the well had been drilled.
78. Ortiz Oil Co. v. Com'r, IO2 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), aff'g 37 B. T. A.
656 (938), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 566 (1939) ; Majestic Oil Corp., 42 B. "T. A. 659
(I94o), on app. C. C. A. 8th. The formula adopted in the Ortiz case for the allocation
of cost was disapproved in Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B. T. A. 38 (194o), aff'd,
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In our example, therefore, The Big Gusher Development Co. has
a $Io,ooo capital investmefit in the well (recoverable through deple-
tion and depreciation deductions) and has given up a share of its
future production income. It realizes no income by reason of the
increase in the value of the property attributable to the well. But its
receipt of $50,ooo development capital from The Oil Finance Co. in
exchange for a 1/16 participating interest is a taxable transaction,
since no restriction was placed upon the use of the money for the drill-
ing of a particular well. Its gain (or, presumably, its loss) is meas-
ured by the difference between the $5o,ooo received and the portion
of its investment in the property attributable to the i/i6 participating
interest. The $50,000 does not represent ordinary income from the
property, subject to depletion.
Is there any justification for treating Big Gusher's deal with the
finance company any differently from Mr. Farmer's deal with Mr.
Speculator, or from Mr. Promoter's deal with Big Gusher? It is
difficult to reconcile the "bonuses" of the latter two with the "selling
price" of the former. If any distinction is warranted, it would seem
to be in the opposite direction. The money received by the producer
seems more nearly an anticipation of production income than the money
received by a lessor: the producer's transaction is both physically and
temporally closer to the actual production of oil than is the original
reservation of a highly speculative production interest by the lessor.
The same conclusion would seem to follow if we compare the two
transactions from the standpoint of "sale". The lessor conveys a 5/6
or a 7/8 working interest, whereas the producer generally conveys but
a small fraction of his working interest. The consideration received
by the lessor appears more nearly severed from his 1/6 or i/8 retained
interest than the consideration received by the producer is severed from
his own larger fraction. To reduce the issue to its logical extremes,
we may imagine a lessor receiving a $oo,ooo cash payment plus a
i/1,ooo royalty worth a negligible sum, and the producer selling a
$ioo oil payment out of a fraction of his 999/i,ooo interest. Is the
$ioo,ooo received by the lessor "income from the property", while
the $ioo received by the producer is "selling price"? Perhaps the
answer is that in so extreme a case the lessor's income, too, would be
"selling price". Or perhaps the long-unquestioned rule of Burnet v.
Harmel,7 9 Palmer v. Bender,8 ° and Herring v. Commissioner8' is
118 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cited note 59 supra. In the Ortiz case it was
held also that amounts contributed to the producer by co-owners of the property in
excess of their proportionate shares of the drilling costs were fully taxable to the
producer.
79. 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
8o. 287 U. S. 51 (1933).
81. 293 U. S: 321 (934).
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proven untenable. Or perhaps the two lines of cases will be permitted
to wend their divergent ways with but one arbitrary signpost to inform
the puzzled taxpayer."'
X. THE INVESTOR AND PRODUCTION RIGHTS
The taxation of the investor in production rights follows the same
pattern as that of other owners of "economic interests in the oil and
gas in place." If the interest acquired is a "participating interest" or
an oil payment fight, his share of the production proceeds is taxable
as income from the property, whether or not there has been a formal
assignment of a property interest. 83 It is ordinary income, subject
to depletion, and is not taxable as capital gain. 4 Even when the in-
vestment is in the form of a "loan" to be repaid out of oil produced,
the taxpayer may not recoup his investment out of the first payments:
the "loan" is merely the basis for cost depletion."5 In our example,
therefore, The Oil Finance Co. obtains a $50,000 investment in the oil
and gas in place. The production income which it receives is fully
taxable as income from the property, except as such income is reduced
either by percentage depletion, or by depletion based upon its $50,000
cost.
If the owner of royalty, oil payment or other production rights
sells his interest, the effect is that of any other sale of property: the
difference between the selling price and the undepleted cost (or other
basis) is taxable as gain or loss. If the taxpayer exchanges his interest
for other production rights, the computation of a gain or loss must
overcome the difficulty of evaluating the interest acquired. In two
cases before the Board, gain was twice recognized on the receipt of
a working interest, and once denied on the receipt of an oil payment
right.8 6 It is certainly questionable whether this factual difference
82. Inevitably, however, the borderline cases will arise. In Berry Oil Co. v.
United States, 25 F. Supp. 97 (Ct. Cl., 1939), the taxpayer lessee assigned the drilling
rights beyond a specified depth, the consideration consisting of a lump-sum payment,
a contingent lump-sum payment if the well was developed, and a right to one-half of the
production after deducting taxes, drilling expenses, etc. The taxpayer was denied
depletion against the initial lump-sum payment, on the ground that the payment repre-
sented "selling price" of a one-half interest. Here, the taxpayer was more nearly in
the position of a lessor or assignor than of a producer, yet the Hamnel, Palmer, and
Herring cases were held inapplicable. Perhaps the same result could have been
reached on firmer ground: since the taxpayer was not a producer with respect to the
depth of producing ground subject to the assignment, his reservation of a share of net
profits was not an "economic interest" under the rule of Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land
Development Co. 303 U. S. 372 (1938), cited note 40 supra.
83. T. W. Lee, 42 B. T. A. 1217 (1940).
84. Charles Pettit, 41 B. T. A. 264 (94o), aff'd, 118 F. (2d) 816 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941), cert. denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 68 (941).
85. Roland L. Taylor, 44 B. T. A. 370 (941), appeal pending, Ct. App. D. C.
86. Midfield Oil Co., 39 B. T. A. 1154 (1939); Kay Kimbell, 41 B. T. A. 940
(1940). In the latter case, it was held that the exchange of a working interest for an
oil payment was a "taxable" exchange, but that no gain was realized until the tax-
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justifies the difference in result. It is possible, of course, that either
type of interest may, in a given case, be so clearly realizable as to jus-
tify an immediate tax upon its receipt in an exchange. In the usual
case, however, it would seem not undue lenience to postpone the tax
until the income is realized by actual production.
XI. THE DRILLING CONTRACTOR AND PRODUCTION RIGHTS
When a drilling contractor is engaged for a fixed amount of cash,
the excess of that amount over his cost is ordinary business income. 87
If, however, part or all of his compensation consists of a right to share
in gross production, he joins the circle of "economic interests" and is
privileged to partake of its tax complications.
To the extent that the consideration received by the contractor is
an interest in the property, his drilling costs represent a capital invest-
ment, rather than a current expense. This is true whether or not his
interest was created by a formal assignment, 88 and whether the drilling
expenses were incurred before or after his acquisition of the interest.8 9
The present fair market value of the interest is not income at the time
the interest is acquired, 0 but neither may the entire drilling cost be
recouped from the first production payments. 91 In other words, the
contractor's "economic interest" is the same as that of a lessor or of
payer's basis of the working interest was recovered out of production. The Board
seemed to imply that the income derived after such recovery would be taxable as
capital gain-a taxpayer's windfall, indeed. In E. C. Laster, 43 B. T. A. 159 (940),
appeal pending, C. C. A. 5th, the taxpayer had received oil payment rights in a cor-
porate liquidation, and the then value of the oil payments had presumably been
taken into account in computing the taxpayer's gain or loss on liquidation. Income
subsequently realized on the oil payments was held ordinary income, subject to deple-
tion, but not subject to the recoupment of cost from the first payments received. Since
gain or loss on liquidation is the same as gain or loss on an exchange of property
(see Robert J. 'Boudreau, 45 B. T. A. No. 70 (1941) cited note 34 mcpra) the distinc-
tion between the Kimbell and Laster cases as to the nature of the income would seem
to stand solely on whether or not gain or loss was recognized on the exchange. The
rule, it is submitted, should be the same in both cases. Since the oil payment in both
cases represents an "economic interest", the amounts subsequently realized from pro-
duction should be ordinary income subject to depletion. If the oil payment right had
no fair market value, at the time of the exchange, its basis for depletion should be
the same as that of the interest transferred in exchange. This should follow whether
or not the exchange qualified under the "like kind exchange' provisions of IT . REV.
CODE, § 112 (b) (i). See E. C. Laster, supra.
87. Rowan Drilling Co., 44 B. T. A. 189 (1941).
88. T. W. Lee, 42 B. T. A. 1217 (i94o). The Board expressly overruled the dis-
tinction which had previously been expressed in Cook Drilling Co., 38 B. T. A. 291
(1938), and F. H. E. Oil Co., 41 B. T. A. I3o (1940).
89. F. F. Hardesty, 43 B. T. A. 245 (941), appeal pending, C. C. A. 5th; Hodges
Drilling Co., 43 B. T. A. 1045 (1941); G. C. M. 22224, 1940-2 Cum. Bun. 216.
go. Com'r v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'g
35 B. T. A. 341 (1937).
91. Dearing v. Com'r, io2 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Fleming v. Com'r,
121 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); T. W. Lee, 42 B. T. A. 1217 (940). In Rowan
Drilling Co., 44 B. T. A. 189 (I941), the taxpayer was allowed percentage depletion
against oil payments realized in the taxable year, though it had deducted its drilling
costs as expenses in a prior year.
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an investor: his share of production income is taxable as ordinary
income, subject to depletion. For the purpose of cost depletion, of
course, his basis is the drilling costs for which the interest was
obtained.
If the driller receives a fixed cash payment in addition to the
interest in the property, the drilling cost must be apportioned in the
ratio which the cash bears to the present value of the interest. In our
example The Deep Drilling Co. spent $2o,oo0 to drill the well, and
received $io,ooo in cash plus a $50,000 oil payment. If the oil pay-
ment is assumed to be worth $30,000, then Y4 of the $2o,ooo cost is
allocable to the $io,ooo cash, and the $5,ooo net amount is taxable as
ordinary business income. The remainder of the cost is available for
cost depletion against the income to be realized on the oil payment.
One further point may be noted. Had the drilling company re-
ceived a participating interest in addition to the cash and the oil pay-
ment, an allocation of cost among the three classes of consideration
would be required. The portion allocable to the participating interest
would be further apportioned between depletable and depreciable prop-
erty. The importance of the latter step is that a percentage depletion
deduction may be taken against the production income without the
sacrifice of the depreciation deduction based on cost.
9 2
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the courts have woven the multiplicity of oil and
gas interests into a reasonably consistent pattern. The attempt has been
made to tax all production income, but to avoid the duplication of such
tax upon the various interests in the chain of title. The one serious
criticism of the pattern is that the Supreme Court too narrowly lim-
ited the test for "economic interest", with the result that a lessor or
assignor may obtain an unwarranted advantage at the expense of the
producer. Payments by one interest to another in anticipation of pro-
duction have been treated with somewhat less consistency. Perhaps
the Supreme Court's early analogy between a lessor's bonus and advance
royalties warrants re-examination; certainly the different rules applied
in the oil payment and bonus case, and in the producer-investor case
rest upon tenuous distinctions.
Athwart any possible tax pattern, however, is the barrier of per-
centage depletion. If cost depletion were the only offset against pro-
duction income, the problem would be to measure each taxpayer's
income in relation to his investment. From that point of view, it would
92. G. C. M. 22332, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 228.
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not be too difficult to synthesize the various interests involved in an
oil and gas property, and to allocate the tax burden. Since cost is not
a factor in determining the arbitrary deduction for percentage deple-
tion, such an allocation ceases to be a matter of logic and tax principle.
The distinction between income from property and gain or loss on the
disposition of property is important throughout the tax law. It de-
termines not only the rate of tax applicable to the transaction, but
whether any, or part, or all, of the taxpayer's cost is to be offset against
such income. But where this distinction determines whether or not
ioo% or 72Y74 of the taxpayer's income is subject to tax, regardless
of cost, the refinements of property interests have a slight flavor of
fantasy. The inevitable result has been an artificiality of reasoning
which frequently defies analysis.
